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FACEBOOK OR FACE BANK?
Carmen Aguado*
On June 7, 2011, social media giant Facebook Inc. debuted its facial
recognition tool to all of its users. The facial recognition tool has the capability of identifying individuals automatically in photographs uploaded to
Facebook by its users. Soon thereafter, the facial recognition tool prompted
privacy concerns and ultimately led to a complaint being filed with the
Federal Trade Commission. While at first denying its use of facial recognition technology, Facebook eventually admitted to its use of the technology.
However, Facebook failed to acknowledge that it collected and stored the
biometric data—data that is considered highly sensitive—of all of its users
without their consent. Accordingly, Facebook violated the privacy rights
of its users when it covertly collected and stored the data. Although it may
be possible for users to bring a private action against Facebook for privacy
violations, they would, nevertheless, be confronted with a tremendous
roadblock—the issue of standing. Without the ability to legally protect
their data, Facebook users are left with little recourse. Accordingly, the
United States Government and courts must heighten privacy protections of
personalized information, such as biometric data, to prevent companies like
Facebook from usurping highly sensitive personalized data of their users.

* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A., Loyola Marymount University, 2007.
The author would like to thank her loving family (Rodolfo Jr., Jacqueline, Cynthia, Rodolfo III,
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burning the midnight oil with her while completing this article and Loyola Law School Professor
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merely an outline. Finally, the author would like to give a tremendous thanks to Note and Comment Editor John Toton, whose enthusiasm encouraged her to pursue the topic, and to the editors
and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their efforts and help in
making this publication possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In early June of 2011, Facebook unveiled a new feature called “tag
suggestions” to all of its users.1 Tag suggestions activate when a user uploads a picture to his or her Facebook page.2 Immediately, Facebook’s facial recognition software identifies the people in the photographs.3 Facebook states that the facial recognition tool “speed[s] up the process of
identifying and labeling people in photos.”4 However, the strength of
Facebook’s facial recognition technology relies on the depth of its facial
recognition database.5 The database is comprised of Facebook users that
have previously been tagged in photographs, many of whom were unaware
that Facebook was storing their unique facial features.6 This process may
sound harmless at first—Facebook is simply making it easier to tag pictures. However, when users learn how facial recognition technology
works, the “convenience” of this technology may make many feel uneasy
because it arguably constitutes an invasion of privacy.

1. See Justin Mitchell, Making Photo Tagging Easier, FACEBOOK BLOG (June 30, 2011,
5:16 PM), https://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=467145887130 [hereinafter Mitchell I].
2. See Justin Mitchell, Making Photo Tagging Easier, FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.facebook.com/blog/blog.php?post=467145887130 [hereinafter Mitchell II] (“When
[users] upload new photos, [Facebook] use[s] face recognition software . . . to match . . . new
photos to other photos you’re tagged in. [Facebook] group[s] similar photos together and, whenever possible, suggest[s] the name of the friend in the photos.”); see also Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, Why Facebook’s Facial Recognition is Creepy, PCWORLD (June 8, 2011), http://www.
pcworld.com/article/229742/why_facebooks_facial_recognition_is_creepy.html
(“Basically,
Facebook is using facial recognition technology to ‘suggest’ tags to users who upload photos.”).
3. See Mitchell II, supra note 2 (“When [users] upload new photos, [Facebook] use[s]
face recognition software . . . to match [] new photos to other photos you’re tagged in. [Facebook] group[s] similar photos together and, whenever possible, suggest[s] the name of the friend
in the photos.”).
4. See Alexei Oreskovic & Georgina Prodhan, Facebook Gives Regulators Info on Facial
Recognition, REUTERS (June 8, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/facebookidUSN0826171920110608.
5. See Declan McCullagh, Face-matching with Facebook Profiles: How It Was Done,
CNET NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20088456-281/face-matchingwith-facebook-profiles-how-it-was-done/#ixzz1n3uRVy17 (stating that Facebook has a “vast
database” of “wide-open profile photos”); see also Purewal, supra note 2 (explaining that Facebook’s facial recognition technology “learns” more about a what a person looks each time they
are identified in a photo and, further, that the information is stored in a facial recognition database). See generally General Info, FACE RECOGNITION HOMEPAGE, http://www.face-rec.org/
general-info/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (explaining that facial recognition works by comparing a
still image to a stored database of faces).
6. See Mark Milian, Facebook Lets Users Opt Out of Facial Recognition, CNN TECH
(June 7, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-07/tech/facebook.facial.recognition_1_facebookceo-mark-zuckerberg-facial-recognition-face-recognition?_s=PM.
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This invasion of privacy has unnerved many in the industry.7 Eric
Schmidt, former Google CEO, saw no privacy concern in 2010 when he
said, “[Google doesn’t] need you to type at all. We know where you are.
We know where you’ve been. We can more or less know what you’re
thinking about.”8 Schmidt, however, does find facial recognition technology to be problematic.9 He stated that Google would not use facial
recognition technology because its accuracy was “very concerning” and it
was “too creepy.”10
Schmidt’s concerns are not without merit. The ways in which the information generated by the technology can be used makes the facial recognition software bothersome. For example, someone could casually snap a
photo of an unsuspecting stranger and then match that stranger to his or her
online identity within minutes using a computer application that integrates
facial recognition technology with data accessible on the Internet.11 Facebook’s user profile pictures,12 which are now public by default,13 and other
accessible data on Facebook, could facilitate this process.14 With the images that are available online, including every Facebook user’s profile picture, technologically savvy individuals can potentially match a face with a
7. See, e.g., Daily Mail Reporter, “Too Creepy Even for Google”: Search Engine Boss
Warns Government Against Facial Recognition Technology, MAIL ONLINE (May 20, 2011),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1388855/Google-CEO-Eric-Schmidt-warns-go
vernments-facial-recognition-technology.html#ixzz1bYgc8E6f (explaining that Schmidt believes
the use of facial recognition technology by organizations crosses the proverbial line and can
amount to an invasion of privacy).
8. Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: “The Laws Are Written by Lobbyists”, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceo-the-laws-arewritten-by-lobbyists/63908/.
9. See Daily Mail Reporter, supra note 7 (explaining that Schmidt believes the use of facial recognition technology by organizations crosses the proverbial line and can amount to an invasion of privacy).
10. See id.
11. See Jared Keller, Cloud-Powered Facial Recognition Is Terrifying, ATLANTIC (Sept.
29,
2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/09/cloud-powered-facialrecognition-is-terrifying/245867/ (“With Carnegie Mellon’s cloud-centric new mobile app, the
process of matching a casual snapshot with a person’s online identity takes less than a minute.”).
12. Profile, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/profile/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2012) (“Your [Facebook] profile begins with a quick summary of who you are, giving friends an
easy way to see where you live now, where you’re working and more.”); see also Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (stating that a profile picture is to “help[] your friends and family recognize you” and is always publicly available).
13. See Basic Privacy Controls, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=
132569486817869 (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (explaining your Facebook profile picture is made
visible to everyone, including individuals not on Facebook).
14. See Keller, supra note 11.
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Social Security number.15 Three days after Facebook launched tag suggestions, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filed a Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief (“EPIC
Complaint”) with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), urging the FTC
to investigate Facebook’s new automated tagging feature.16 The complaint
alleges, inter alia, that: (1) Facebook is involved in “unfair and deceptive
acts and practices” by its continued use of the automatic tagging feature;
(2) Facebook’s implementation of the facial recognition technology is an
invasion of privacy, which not only causes harm to consumers, but is done
without their consent; and (3) Facebook’s collection of biometric data from
children is contrary to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of
1988.17 Additionally, the EPIC complaint requests that the FTC require
Facebook to:
1. Immediately suspend Facebook-initiated tagging or
identification of users based on Facebook’s database of
facial images;
2. Not misrepresent how it “maintains and protects the security, privacy, confidentiality, and integrity of any consumer information”;
3. Provide additional disclosures to users prior to new or
additional sharing of information with third parties; and
4. Establish, implement, and maintain a comprehensive
privacy program.18
The EPIC Complaint focuses on Facebook’s business practices19 because the FTC is equipped to pursue such violations under section 5(a) of
15. See id.; see also More than Facial Recognition, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.,
http://www.cmu.edu/homepage/society/2011/summer/facial-recognition.shtml (last visited Apr.
15, 2012) (explaining how researchers were able to use facial recognition technology to predict
personal interest and in a few instances Social Security numbers).
16. See Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief, In re Facebook, Inc. and the Facial Identification of Users (2011) (on file with FTC), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/EPIC_FB_FR_FTC_Complaint_06_10_11.pdf.
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 24, 33–34.
19. The FTC settled the complaint with Facebook in November of 2011. See Press Release, FTC, Facebook Settles FTC Charges that It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm.
However, the November 2011 settlement between the FTC and Facebook does not mention the
facial recognition tool or Facebook’s acquisition of biometric data. See Agreement Containing
Consent Order, In re Facebook, Inc. (No. 092-3183), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf. The settlement does not apply retroactively, thus the data
that has already been obtained without consent can remain in Facebook’s database. See id. How-
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the FTC Act.20 However, a private party should also be able to file a complaint against Facebook for constitutional privacy violations and privacy
tort violations.
This Comment will explain the sensitive nature of biometric data and
the reasons that it should be awarded greater legal protections. Part II of
this Comment will (1) provide a brief overview of the history of facial
recognition technology, (2) describe the sequence of events leading to
Facebook’s implementation of its facial recognition technology, and
(3) address reasons why Facebook users should be concerned about this
new technology. Part III explains the violations Facebook has committed
in illegally obtaining its users’ biometric data.21 Part IV will discuss the
two primary issues that a private party might face when filing a suit, notwithstanding the applicability of various privacy laws. Finally, Part V of
this Comment will provide suggestions on steps that the United States
Government and courts should take to ensure that private information, such
as biometrics, receives greater protections.
II. THE ORIGINS OF BIOMETRIC DATA
Biometric data use has grown substantially since the 1960s.22 In the
1960s, facial recognition technology became semi-automated, whereby a
ever, the settlement requires Facebook to create a “comprehensive privacy program” that is designed to address privacy risks related to the facial recognition tool. See id. at 5 (“It is further
ordered that Respondent shall . . . establish . . . a comprehensive privacy program . . . to (1) address privacy risks related to the development and management of new and existing products and
services for consumers.” (emphasis added)). The privacy program is to be designed by Facebook
employees and gives the employees the responsibility of identifying the issues. See id. Thus, the
great responsibility of rectifying the privacy issues related to Facebook’s taking of biometric data
falls on the shoulders of Facebook.
20. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012)
(“The basic consumer protection statute enforced by the [FTC] is Section 5(a) of the FTC Act,
which provides that ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . .
declared unlawful.’” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
21. The violations discussed in Part III are not exclusive. For example, Facebook could
also be found in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which protects individuals from interception and monitoring of their electronic communications. See generally Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2011). Because e-mail and data
stored electronically are covered by this definition, monitoring of such communications is generally prohibited. Id. Facebook violates the Act because it has intentionally intercepted electronic
data by taking their users’ biometric data from photographs without consent.
22. See generally NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, Biometrics History, BIOMETRICS.GOV,
8, 13 (2006), http://www.biometrics.gov/documents/biohistory.pdf (explaining that in the 1960s
facial recognition was semi-automated, whereas, by the 1990s, the technology advanced to become fully-automated).
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system administrator had to locate key features in the photographs.23 Once
the key features were manually identified, the system would calculate the
distances from the key facial features and automatically compare the image
to the reference data.24 Law enforcement agencies began to use the semiautomated technology by the 1980s.25 This was illustrated in 1988, when
the Lakewood Division of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
used images of suspects captured in surveillance tapes and compared those
images against its database of mug shots to find matches.26 Semiautomated facial recognition was only the beginning of facial recognition
technology. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, facial recognition technology became fully-automated with “eigenface technology,” which allowed
for real-time face recognition.27 Simply stated, with fully-automated realtime facial recognition, an image of one’s face can be automatically recognized and matched to other images in a database, without a system administrator manually locating the key features.28
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the
federal government paid “significantly enhanced attention” to biometric
technologies.29 By 2009, there were more than thirty publicly available databases for facial recognition analysis.30 Today, applications such as
Google’s Picasa, Apple iPhoto, Sony’s Picture Motion Browser, Windows
Live Photo Gallery, and Facebook, all use facial recognition technology.31
However, Facebook, unlike the other companies, impinged on the privacy
rights of its users by covertly accumulating its robust database of biometric
data.32 The potentially exploitative nature of personal biometric data suggests that keeping this information private is extremely important.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 13 (stating the Lakewood Division of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department began using a semi-automated facial recognition system).
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id.
28. See Matthew A. Turk & Alex P. Pentland, Face Recognition Using Eigenfaces,
BLAVATNIK SCH. COMPUTER SCI. – TEL AVIV UNIV., http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~shekler/
Seminar2007a/PCA%20and%20Eigenfaces/eigenfaces_cvpr.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
29. See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, BIOMETRICS in Government POST-9/11: Advancing Science, Enhancing Operation, OFF. SCI. & TECH. POL’Y 13 (2008), available at http://
www.biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics%20in%20Government%20Post%209-11.pdf.
30. See id.
31. See Emily Shultz, Comment to Activate Face Recognition Log On in Laptop,
TECHYV.COM (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.techyv.com/questions/activate-face-recognition-loglaptop.
32. See Tharun Venkatesan, Google Plus Facial Recognition: Find My Face,
TECHNOSTREAK.COM (Dec. 10, 2011), http://technostreak.com/web/social/google-plus/google-
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A. A Glimpse into Facial Recognition Technology and Its Significance
Biometric data consists of “measurable . . . distinctive physical characteristic[s] or personal trait[s] that can be used to identify an individual.”33
For example, facial recognition software initially locates distinctive features on the face and the measurements of the facial features, such as the
distance between eyes or width of nose.34 These measurements are compiled to create an algorithm or biometric template of a person’s face.35 Facial recognition software then stores the template of the facial image in a
database and compares the template to other stored images.36 Advancements in facial recognition technology have allowed for individuals and
private companies like Facebook to scan an image of a face and correlate
the image to a Facebook user’s profile.37
The biometric data fueling facial recognition technology is highly
personal, individualized information, such that the data could eventually be
used to link a stranger on the street to his or her credit score.38 It employs
unique identifiers such as fingerprints.39 Because of the importance and
private nature of this data and the accelerated advancements in biometric
technology, the National Science and Technology Council (“NSTC”), a
Cabinet-level Council,40 established a subcommittee to specifically re-

plus-facial-recognition-find-my-face/ (explaining that Google Plus also uses facial recognition
technology, but unlike Facebook, Google Plus allows users to opt in or out).
33. John D. Woodward, Jr., Christopher Horn, Julius Gatune & Aryn Thomas, Biometrics: A Look at Facial Recognition, RAND, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/DB396.pdf.
34. See Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Does Facial Recognition Work?, GLOBE &
MAIL (Jul. 25, 2011), http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/facialrecognition1.htm/.
35. See Bryan Gardiner, Engineers Test Highly Accurate Face Recognition, WIRED (Mar.
24, 2008), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/03/new_face_recognition.
36. See id.
37. See McCullagh, supra note 5.
38. See generally NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, Biometrics Frequently Asked Questions, BIOMETRICS.GOV, 21 (2006), http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/FAQ.pdf; see also
Natasha Singer, Face Recognition Makes the Leap From Sci-Fi, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/business/face-recognition-moves-from-sci-fi-to-social-me
dia.html (quoting researchers explaining how facial recognition software can be used by marketers to infer personal information about random individuals on the street).
39. See For Unique ID, Photo No Alternative to Fingerprint, DECCAN HERALD (Jan. 25),
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/48769/for-unique-id-photo-no.html (explaining that although fingerprints were found more accurate than facial recognition technology, at that time,
both use biometric data that is personalized).
40. See About NSTC, OFFICE SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
administration/eop/ostp/nstc/about (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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search biometric technology in 2003.41 While the NSTC primarily serves
as a medium for government agencies and the public to access information
concerning the Government’s use of technology in general,42 the subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management (“BIM”) assists in coordinating development in federal biometrics.43
By 2006, recognizing the public concern surrounding biometrics, the
sensitivity of the information obtained, and highly personal nature of the
data collected, BIM urged companies to use privacy assessments whenever
the use of biometric information is employed.44 BIM’s concern in protecting the data stems from the ability of biometrics to detect human emotions45 and its potential to identify an individual’s ethnicity—information
that is generally regarded as private.46 Accordingly, the U.S. government
considers biometric data to be “sensitive personal information”47 and believes that standards and regulations should be followed in any implementation of technology that uses biometric data.48
Appreciating the sensitive nature of biometrics, the U.S. government
classifies biometric data as Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”).49
PII is any information that can be used to trace an individual’s identity,50

41. See NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management Room,
BIOMETRICS.GOV, http://www.biometrics.gov/nstc/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
42. See About NSTC, supra note 40.
43. See NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management Room, supra note
41 (explaining the purpose and objectives of BIM).
44. See PETER E. SAND ET AL., NSTC SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 35 (2006), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/
docs/privacy.pdf (explaining how the Government should apply privacy to biometric technology).
45. See Daniel Shemesh, Face Recognition Software Could Detect Pain in Patients, PIPE
DREAM (May 6, 2011), http://www2.bupipedream.com/news/face-recognition-software-coulddetect-pain-in-patients-1.2223624#.Tp6PSt5 (noting that facial recognition technology can potentially detect pain in patients); see also Omri Ceren, Creepy Airport Facial Recognition Automatically Detects Lying, JAUNTED (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.jaunted.com/story/2011/9/7/
134855/2920/travel/creepy+airport+facial+recognition+automatically+detects+lying (noting facial recognition in airports can detect lying).
46. See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 4.
47. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 14.
49. See Biometrics & Personally Identifiable Information: Assessing the Impact of U.S.
Policy and Laws on the Use of Biometrics by Government Agencies and Evaluating Solutions to
Meet Government Operational Requirements, NAT’L BIOMETRIC SECURITY PROJECT, 9, 13
(2010), available at http://www.nationalbiometric.org/downloads/biometrics-and-privacy-reportfinal-2011-02-22.pdf (defining biometrics as personally identifiable information and discussing
the privacy issues that arise from biometrics being classified as PII).
50. Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), NARA 1608, 3 (Aug. 6,
2009), http://www.archives.gov/foia/directives/nara1608.pdf.
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and, often, Congress enacts legislation to protect PII.51 For example, in
2006, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. section 1028, which criminalizes the use
of identification documents to steal one’s identity.52 The statute gives biometric data, the information used in facial recognition technology, the same
weight as a Social Security number, a government-issued driver’s license,
or an identification number.53 However, despite the recognition that biometric data is as personal and as important to protect as Social Security
numbers, it has yet to receive the same level of attention from legislators
and protection on the Internet.54
Because biometric data is sensitive and is classified as PII,55 Facebook should have given its users’ privacy greater deference prior to collecting their biometric data. Due to this lack of attention and its surreptitious
collection of the data, Facebook is in violation of several privacy laws.
B. A Snapshot of Facebook’s Use of Facial Recognition Technology
Facebook has become the largest social networking website, boasting
approximately 800 million users worldwide.56 It is the second mosttrafficked site57 in the world and brands itself as a company that “facilitate[s] the sharing of information through the social graph.”58 Over 400 mil51. Peter Gray, Protecting Privacy and Security of Personal Information in the Global Electronic Marketplace, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/ico2.htm (explaining how
Congressmen have proposed online privacy bills to protect personally identifiable information).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1)–(8) (2006).
53. See id. § 1028(d)(7)(A)–(D) (listing biometric data as a means of identification in
conjunction with name and Social Security number).
54. The need to protect Social Security numbers has generated widespread attention from
government agencies. See Soc. Sec. Admin., Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number, SSA
Pub. No. 05-10064 (2009), available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.html (providing information on
the importance of protecting your Social Security number and how to prevent identity theft); see
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.85(a)(3)–(4) (prohibiting businesses and non-government entities
from displaying Social Security numbers over the Internet, unless the connection is secure);
S. 1691, 110th Cong. §§ 1–3 (2007) (proposing the restriction of the use and display of Social Security numbers to prevent identity theft and fraud. The proposed bill has been reintroduced several
times, but has not yet passed). The actions taken to protect Social Security numbers, at the state
and federal level, as described, display the government’s support in protecting Social Security
numbers and further, its acknowledged importance of the information.
55. See Biometrics & Personally Identifiable Information: Assessing the Impact of U.S.
Policy and Laws on the Use of Biometrics by Government Agencies and Evaluating Solutions to
Meet Government Operational Requirements, supra note 49 (explaining that biometric information is PII).
56.
See Newsroom, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?
NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
57. Top Sites, ALEXA.COM, http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
58. Peering, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/peering/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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lion of Facebook’s users log in to their Facebook accounts daily,59 250 million photos are uploaded onto Facebook every twenty-four hours,60 and
more than 7 million applications and websites are integrated with Facebook.61 Facebook’s privacy policy,62 monitored by TRUSTe,63 assures the
information that users share through their Facebook profile is safeguarded.64
Facebook’s privacy policy is broken into several categories.65 It covers the type of information Facebook receives about users, the information
that can be accessed by users with their username or user identification, the
information made public (that which can be viewed by anyone, including
people who are not on Facebook), and the way that Facebook uses the information it collects.66 Facebook’s privacy policy states that Facebook receives and stores metadata from a user’s computer, such as the time, place,
and date of photo uploads.67 However, the policy fails to mention that users’ biometric data is stored as well.68
Facebook’s The Facebook Blog chronicled Facebook’s increasingly
advanced use of facial recognition technology.69 The first mention of the
enhanced tagging features was in July of 2010 when Facebook blogged,
“With this new feature, tagging is faster since you don’t need to select a

59. See Newsroom, supra note 56.
60. Ben Parr, Facebook by the Numbers [INFOGRAPHIC], MASHABLE SOC. MEDIA
(Oct. 21, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/10/21/facebook-infographic/.
61. Derrick Harris, Facebook Shares Some Secrets on Making MySQL Scale, GIGAOM
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://gigaom.com/cloud/facebook-shares-some-secrets-on-making-mysql-scale/;
see also Kate Freeman, Facebook Apps: Highlights of the 60 New Integrated Applications,
MASHABLE SOC. MEDIA (Jan. 22, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/01/22/facebook-apps/ (explaining how applications integrated with Facebook allow Facebook users to share their activity
on the application with their Facebook friends).
62. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12.
63. See TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/about_TRUSTe/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012)
(stating that TRUSTe is a third-party company that monitors private companies to ensure compliance with the companies’ stated privacy policy).
64. See Newsroom, supra note 56.
65. See generally Data Use Policy, supra note 12.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See FACEBOOK BLOG, http://blog.facebook.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (providing a forum where Facebook employees give updates regarding new Facebook tools and features.
To access THE FACEBOOK BLOG, users have to navigate their way through the Facebook “About”
section, then to the “Info” section, and then click on the hyperlink that connects to the blog. THE
FACEBOOK BLOG then opens in a new window. Users unaware of the blog had no notice of the
changes Facebook was implementing.).
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face. It’s already selected for you, just like those rectangles you see around
your friends’ faces when you take a photo with a modern digital camera.”70
Facebook subsequently acquired Divvyshot, a photo-sharing site.71
In September 2010, Sam Odio, Facebook’s Photo Products Manager, explained the technology behind the bulk tagging features Facebook began
to use:
This isn’t face recognition. . . . Picasa and iPhoto—they’ll
detect a face and say, “This is Sam,” and they’ll suggest that it’s
Sam. We’re not doing that. We’re not linking any faces to profiles automatically. Right now, we want to stay away from that
because it’s a very touchy subject.72
However, this statement was inaccurate. Picasa and iPhoto use facial
recognition data in a similar fashion to Facebook.73 As a matter of fact, the
only difference between Picasa, iPhoto, and Facebook is that Facebook uses a different facial recognition software company.74 By December of
2010, Facebook reported to its users that the website would begin using
“tag suggestions,”75 and that the tool would be implemented in the United
States starting in December 2010 and continue through January 2011.76
Facebook further explained:
When you or a friend upload new photos, we use face recognition software—similar to that found in many photo editing
tools—to match your new photos to other photos you’re tagged

70. Sam Odio, Making Facebook Photos Better, FACEBOOK BLOG (July 1, 2010, 5:37
PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=403838582130.
71. See Erick Schonfeld, Facebook Buys Up Divvyshot To Make Facebook Photos Even
Better, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 2, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/02/facebook-buys-updivvyshot-to-make-facebook-photos-even-better/ (stating Facebook purchased Divvyshot, a
group photograph-sharing site).
72. See Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Photos Get High Resolution, Bulk Tagging, CNET
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20018211-36.html.
73. Compare Josh Lowensohn, Facial Recognition Face-Off: Three Tools Compared,
CNET NEWS (Sept. 30, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27076_3-10363727-248.html (comparing the facial recognition software that iPhoto and Picasa use and how the software is able to automatically recognize individuals in the photographs), with Purewal, supra note 2 (stating Facebook is using facial recognition software that has the ability to recognize individuals in photographs posted on Facebook) (emphasis added).
74. See Lowensohn, supra note 73 (explaining how the facial recognition software works).
75. See Mitchell II, supra note 2.
76. See id.
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in. We group similar photos together and, whenever possible,
suggest the name of the friend in the photos.77
This announcement marked the first time Facebook confirmed it was using
facial recognition software.78
Although Odio stated that Facebook was not using facial recognition
technology,79 less than a year later, Facebook’s Engineering Manager, Justin
Mitchell, admitted Facebook was essentially actively using facial recognition technology with its tag suggestion software.80 The immediate availability of tag suggestions inevitably meant that Facebook had been collecting its
users’ biometric data before the 2011 release of the tag suggestion tool, otherwise Facebook would not have been able to make the new technology instantly available to its users. Facebook soon thereafter admitted it had misled users regarding its use of facial recognition software.81
However, Facebook and its blog entries do not explain how the tag
suggestions tool actually functions.82 For instance, the blog states that the
tag suggestion tool is a default setting for all users,83 but there is no disclosure that Facebook collects the data necessary to run the tool without user
consent.84 Facebook users are only given the option to turn off the automatic tagging feature and have their biometric data deleted only after the
feature is installed.85 To turn off this feature, a user must navigate through

77. See id.
78. See Caroline McCarthy, Facial Recognition Comes to Facebook Photo Tags, CNET
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20025818-36.html (“Facebook announced [Dec. 15, 2010] that it will soon enable facial-recognition technology,” which is “the
first time facial recognition software has been incorporated into Facebook’s consumer service.”).
79. See McCarthy, supra note 72.
80. Mitchell I, supra note 1; see also Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Facial Recognition Technology Sparks Renewed Concerns, REUTERS (June 8, 2011) (“On Tuesday, Facebook said it had
expanded the availability of its “Tag Suggestions” product, which uses facial recognition technology
to automatically identify the people who appear in certain photos posed on Facebook.”).
81. See Oreskovic, supra note 80 (quoting Facebook’s spokesperson as saying, “[w]e
should have been more clear with people during the roll-out process when this became available
to them”).
82. Megan Geuss, Facebook Facial Recognition: Its Quiet Rise and Dangerous Future,
PCWORLD (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/226228/facebook_facial_recognition
_its_quiet_rise_and_dangerous_future.html (assisting Facebook users in understanding how Facebook’s facial recognition tool works because Facebook did not explain the facial recognition feature it had implemented).
83. See Mitchell I, supra note 1.
84. See id. See generally FACEBOOK BLOG, supra note 69.
85. See In re Facebook and the Facial Identification of Users, EPIC (June 10, 2011),
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/facebook_and_facial_recognitio.html (emphasis added).
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his or her privacy settings to “opt out” of the tag suggestion service.86 In
addition to opting out, a user has to send a message to Facebook and specifically request that Facebook delete the data that it has collected.87 This
multi-layered process is confusing and there is no instruction page or notification alerting users that opting out is an option.88 To compensate for
Facebook’s instructional shortcomings, various news outlets began posting
systematic manuals to assist Facebook users through the numerous steps
required to remove the information.89
C. Facebook Users Should Be Concerned
Facebook users should be concerned that Facebook stores their personally identifiable information for three main reasons. First, Facebook
has been involved in litigation as a result of its lack of privacy controls.
Second, Facebook does not publicize how the biometric data is secured.
Finally, Internet hackers have shown their resilience and capacity to infiltrate the Internet servers of security firms to obtain sensitive information,90
thus posing a potential threat to Facebook. Without added protections and
safeguards to ensure the safe storage of biometric data, Facebook users
should request that Facebook delete their biometric data.

86. Facebook customers are automatically opted into having their biometric data stored. See
Oreskovic, supra note 80 (explaining Facebook users had their data stored without their knowledge).
However, due to a November 2011 settlement between the FTC and Facebook, the FTC now requires Facebook to let users opt into changes that alter how their personal information is shared and
stored. See Elinor Mills, Facebook Privacy Practices Get FTC Shakeup, CNET NEWS (Nov. 29,
2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-57333008-245/facebook-privacy-practices-get-ftcshakeup/ (discussing the settlement that was reached between the FTC and Facebook).
87. See EPIC Warns of Facebook ‘Biometric Data Collection’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 14,
2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/162891/20110614/epic-ftc-facebook-facial-recognition.htm.
88. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (explaining how tag suggestions work, but noticeably lacking instructions on how users can compel Facebook to remove their biometric data from
the database).
89. See e.g., Amy Lee, How to Disable Facebook’s New Facial Recognition Feature,
HUFFINGTON POST TECH. (June 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/08/disablefacebook-facial-recognition-photo-feature_n_873018.html.
90. See e.g., Nate Anderson, How One Man Tracked Down Anonymous—and Paid a
Heavy Price, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/howone-security-firm-tracked-anonymousand-paid-a-heavy-price.ars/.
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1. Old Habits Die Hard: Facebook’s Privacy Litigation
Facebook has a nonchalant attitude toward its users’ privacy,91 which
has been highlighted in various lawsuits involving Facebook’s lack of privacy protections.92 For example, in In re Facebook Privacy Litigation the
district court held that Facebook did not violate the law when it provided its
users’ personally identifiable information to third-party advertisers because
the advertisers were the intended recipients of the information.93 Nevertheless, without its users’ knowledge, Facebook facilitated the transmission of
its users’ personally identifiable information to third parties when a user
clicked on an advertisement posted on Facebook.94
Another more recent example is In Re Zynga Privacy Litigation, a class
action alleging the Facebook application Zynga was transmitting Facebook
User IDs (“UIDs”) to third parties, such as advertisers and Internet tracking
firms.95 Each Facebook user has his or her own unique UID,96 and when an
advertiser has access to a user’s UID, that advertiser is able to discover a user’s personal information.97 The information accessible to the advertiser includes the user’s real name, any public information listed on his or her profile, and the user’s web-browsing history—information the user did not know
was being transmitted to the advertiser.98 Accordingly, Facebook users need
not only be aware of Facebook’s privacy policy, but they must also understand the privacy policies of Facebook’s advertising partners.
Although these two lawsuits are only a fragment of the litigation in
which Facebook has been involved, both cases emphasize that Facebook
passes along its users’ private information, often without specific permis91. See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook Grapples With Privacy Issues, WALL ST. J.
TECH. (May 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870491200457525272310
9845974.html (describing Facebook’s various privacy problems and the view of Facebook’s
founder, Mark Zuckerberg, that users should be more open with their information).
92. See id.
93. See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
94. See id. at 709, 711–13.
95. See Ian Paul, Zynga Hit With Lawsuit Over Facebook Privacy Breach, PCWORLD
(Oct.
20,
2010),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/208267/zynga_hit_with_lawsuit_over_
facebook_privacy_breach.html.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.; see also Richard Esguerra, Facebook’s Broken Promises: Facebook Apps
Leaking Private Data to Advertisers and Trackers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 18,
2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/facebooks-broken-promises-facebook-apps-leaking
(“Internet advertising networks claim to track users ‘anonymously,’ but the Facebook leak allows
these web marketing snoops to associate Facebook users with the supposedly-anonymous browsing-history cookies that trackers use to see a user’s movements across the web.”).
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sion from the user. This litigation illuminates the way in which Facebook
will likely treat the biometric data currently in its control and should undoubtedly raise concern among Facebook users.
2. Facebook Should Create a Strategy to Prevent Privacy Violations
Federal agencies have developed and implemented strategies to ensure that their collection of biometric data will not violate individual privacy concerns, and, further, to prevent the compromising of valuable personal
information.99 While the purpose of the use varies among federal agencies,
facial recognition technology is often used for national security.100 For example, the technology allows law enforcement agencies to identify unknown individuals in photos using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(“FBI”) database of 10 million stored mug shots.101 Unlike Facebook, before the implementation of facial recognition technology, the FBI studied
research from the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Biometrics and Identity Management subcommittee and released a Privacy
Impact Assessment (“PIA”).102 The model described in the FBI’s PIA is
similar to the model suggested by the Biometrics and Identity Management
subcommittee to determine whether a biometric system adequately protects
information privacy.103
The Biometrics and Identity Management subcommittee’s (“BIM”)
model is geared toward government agencies, but, nevertheless, the model
lends insight into what a proper privacy assessment should entail.104 BIM
recommends that the privacy assessment should begin at the collection
phase by determining the expectations of the participants who have chosen
to enroll in the data collection system.105 Subsequently, there should be:
(1) documentation of the purpose and scope of the data collection to make
99. SAND ET AL., supra note 44, at 43–49.
100. Face Recognition, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/facerecognition/ (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012) (stating the Government has used facial recognition technology for security purposes such as border control and general policing purposes).
101. See Aliya Sternsteing, FBI to Launch Nationwide Facial Recognition Service,
NEXTGOV.COM (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111007_6100.php.
102. See id.
103. Compare SAND ET AL., supra note 44, at 40, with Privacy Impact Assessment for the
Next Generation Identification Interstate Photo System, FBI.GOV (June 9, 2008), http://www.
fbi.gov/foi/privacy_impact-assessments/interstate-photo-system.
104. See SAND ET AL., supra note 44, at 54 (stating the primary objective of NSTC is “the
establishment of clear national goals for Federal science and technology investments,” and
NSTC’s research and development strategies are to assist Federal agencies in coordinating national goals (emphasis added)).
105. See id. at 45 (emphasis added).
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certain the data is not used for unintended purposes; (2) a privacy review of
the data to ensure the minimal amount of data is being collected to achieve
the purpose of the agency; (3) identification of other technologies being
used to better assess how the personal data will be used; (4) routine audits
of the data and its uses and assessment of the control of individuals to use
the information; (5) a review of the created template from the observed data; and (6) a decision regarding which data will be stored.106 If implemented properly, BIM projects the system is less apt to infringe on the privacy
rights of the data subjects.107 Again, while this model is focused at government agencies and their use of biometric data, it is accessible by private
companies, such as Facebook.
Supposing Facebook users know that their data fuels the facial recognition tool, there is still no assurance from Facebook that this data will solely be used in the tag suggestions tool.108 Without a clear statement of purpose, as suggested in the BIM model and followed by Government agencies,
there is a strong likelihood the biometric data will be used by Facebook for
purposes other than those originally intended and used without the informed
and voluntary consent of users.109 The process of using information beyond
the originally intended scope has been termed “function creep.”110
Despite the potential privacy violation, function creep is almost inevitable because “[t]he existence of a relatively high integrity scheme would
create irresistible temptations to apply it widely, and interrelate many hitherto separate collections of personal information.”111 Accordingly, in terms
of Facebook’s collection of biometric data, function creep is a viable and
likely possibility, as Facebook does not guarantee its users’ biometric data
will be used solely for the purpose of facilitating the tagging process.112 In
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 45–49.
See id. at 53.
See Purewal, supra note 2.
See JOHN D. WOODWARD ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS: IDENTIFYING
AND ADDRESSING SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS 24 (RAND 2001).
110. See Simon G. Davies, Touching Big Brother: How Biometric Technology Will Fuse
Flesh and Machine, 7 INFO. TECH. & PEOPLE 44 (1994); see also Sloan v. SC Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 25689 (filed Aug. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/
SC/25689.htm (describing an example of function creep that occurred in 1998. The South Carolina Department of Public Safety sold information and photographs used on South Carolina drivers’ licenses and identification cards to Data Image, LLC. Plaintiff was aware that her information was used for her driver’s license, but the transmittal and use of the information beyond its
immediate and obvious scope of use, for driver’s licenses, was a surprise to Plaintiff. As a result,
the sale eventually resulted in a privacy lawsuit.).
111. See Davies, supra note 110, at 38–47 (emphasis added).
112. See Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=privacy
(last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (allowing Facebook users to turn off the tag suggestions feature, but
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addition, Facebook does not have a posted policy stating its projected use
of the biometric data.113 The lack of a strategic model makes privacy violations more likely, based on BMI’s and privacy experts’ projections.
3. Facebook is Not Hacker114 Proof
Facebook is not immune from the wrath of hackers and security
threats, thus making its database of information a potential target for external abuse.115 Facebook’s Security page contains an instructional aide to assist users who have had their Facebook profiles compromised (also known
as “hacked”) and provides information on how to avoid being a victim of
online fraud.116 Despite this instructional aid, Facebook estimates it has
approximately 600,000 imposters accessing users’ personal information on
a daily basis.117 In fact, in January of 2011, Facebook Founder Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook fan page was hacked.118

lacking explanation regarding what the data will additionally be used for or that users can request
that Facebook delete their biometric data). While Facebook does explain that it will extract metadata, Facebook fails to include that in addition to the time, date, and place the photograph was
taken, it also measures the facial features of the people in the photographs. See Data Use Policy,
supra note 12 (explaining to Facebook users that “[w]hen [users] post things like photos or videos
on Facebook, [Facebook] may receive additional related data (or metadata), such as the time,
date, and place [users] took the photo or video.”). Also, by mere definition, biometric data and
metadata are not one and the same—biometric data is information that can identify an individual,
while metadata is background information about a photograph or document, such as when the
photograph was taken or if it has been modified. Compare Woodward, Horn, Gatune & Thomas,
supra note 33 (defining biometric data as “a measurable . . . distinctive physical characteristic or
personal trait that can be used to identify an individual”), with Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. AutomationDirect.com, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 556, 557 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (defining metadata as information
regarding “when the document was created [and] when it was modified . . . .”).
113. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (discussing the use of data, but failing to mention the full extent of the use of biometric data).
114. The term “hacker” is used to describe an individual who secretly manipulates network connections and/or breaks into computer systems. See Ken Hess, What Is a Hacker?,
ZDNET (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:05 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/what-is-a-hacker/9468.
115. See e.g., Emma Barnet, Hackers Go After Facebook Sites 600,000 Times Every Day,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8856417/Hackersgo-after-Facebook-sites-600000-times-every-day.html.
116. Facebook Security, How To Help Your Friends with Security Issues, FACEBOOK
(Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150165098990766.
117. See Barnet, supra note 115.
118. See Ian Paul, Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook Fan Page Hacked, PCWORLD (Jan.
26, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/217784/mark_zuckerbergs_facebook_fan_page_
hacked.html.
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While Facebook has been previously hacked, the damage from hacking has not been exceedingly detrimental to its users.119 However, this
does not mean the potential for hackers to delve into the Facebook database does not exist. Hackers have flaunted their abilities by hacking into
the databases of gaming companies and accessing gamers’ personal information, including credit card information.120 A recent example of the
prowess of hackers is the ambush on the security firm HBGary.121
HBGary provides resources to protect the assets and information of governments and private corporations from espionage.122 Despite HBGary’s
background and field of expertise, in February 2011, a notorious group
called Anonymous hacked HBGary’s database.123 Anonymous124 was able
to access the security firm’s database, including the log-in credentials of
its Chief Executive Officer, which were used to administer a corporate
e-mail account.125
Anonymous’s members later threatened to target Facebook in November 2011.126 Although the attack did not occur and Anonymous later
claimed the threat was merely a hoax, the implication caused security specialists to contemplate the possibility of an attack on Facebook.127 Again,
Facebook has been fortunate in that it has managed to avoid a major breach
of their database; nevertheless, the possibility does exist in light of the capabilities of groups such as Anonymous. Facebook users should thus be

119. See e.g., Facebook Hacked: Are you Seeing Images of Porn and Violence?, ZDNET
(Nov. 14, 2011, 8:21 PM), www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-hacked-are-you-seeingimages-of-porrn-and-violence/5314 (discussing that Facebook was hacked, resulting in select users being flooded with pornographic images); see also Facebook Security: Take Action,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/security?sk=app_10442206389 (last visited Apr. 15,
2012) (stating accounts have been taken over and used to send spam messages).
120. Winda Benedetti, Steam Game Service Hacked, Credit Card Theft Investigated,
MSNBC.COM (Nov. 10, 2011), http://ingame.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/11/10/8742607-steamgame-service-hacked-credit-card-theft-investigated.
121. See John Leyden, Anonymous Security Firm Hack Used Every Trick In Book,
REGISTER (Feb. 17, 2011, 4:52 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/17/hbgary_hack_redux.
122. Company, HBGARY, http://hbgary.com/company (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
123. See Leyden, supra note 121.
124. Declan McCullagh, Alleged Anonymous Members Plead Not Guilty, CNET NEWS
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20100790-281/alleged-anonymous-members
-plead-not-guilty/ (describing Anonymous as a group of “activists who have electronically assaulted commercial and governmental Web sites” by computer hacking).
125. See Leyden, supra note 121.
126. See Adam Clark Estes, Nobody Believes Anonymous Can Hack Facebook, ATLANTIC WIRE (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/08/nobody-believesanonymous-can-hack-facebook/41086/.
127. See id.
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concerned with Facebook storing information regarding the intimate details
of their faces and identities.
III. FACEBOOK’S PRIVACY VIOLATIONS
When Facebook users began identifying their friends in photos, few
knew that Facebook was storing their friends’ biometric data with each
identifying click.128 Facebook’s act of collecting biometric data from its
consumers is an invasion of privacy because biometric data that is continuously used is collected without user consent.129 The data, as shown above,
is highly personal and private to all Facebook users.130 Additionally, most
users may not anticipate that Facebook uses facial recognition technology
to create an algorithm of their faces131 when they simply upload photos to
Facebook.132 The following section provides an analysis of the potential
constitutional privacy violations and potential violations of the applicable
privacy torts as a result of Facebook’s conduct.
A. Constitutional Violations
Due to the state action doctrine, private conduct generally does not
have to comply with the Constitution.133 However, there are circumstances
where the acts of a private individual may be deemed that of the state.134
Simply put, a private individual may be deemed a state actor when the actions of the private party can be considered “fairly attributable” to the
128. See Purewal, supra note 2 (explaining that each time a Facebook user is “tagged” or
identified in an image by a Facebook user, Facebook’s facial recognition technology learns more
about the identified member’s appearance). See generally Gardiner, supra note 35 (explaining
that face recognition tools are able to recognize faces by creating algorithms consisting of biometric data or “meaningful facial features”).
129. See Purewal, supra note 2 (suggesting that Facebook collects users’ biometric information to use for its facial recognition tool).
130. See supra Part II.
131. See Angela Moscaritolo, Shocker: Facebook Users Hate Surprise Photo Tagging,
PCMAG.COM (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2400357,00.asp (stating
Facebook uses facial recognition technology for its tag suggestions tool and that the tag suggestions tool was turned on by Facebook without warning to Facebook users); see also Gardiner,
supra note 35 (explaining that facial recognition systems use algorithms (composed of key facial
features) to identify individuals in photographs).
132. See Milian, supra note 6 (explaining that when Facebook users upload a photograph on Facebook, Facebook uses facial recognition technology to identify the individuals in
the photograph).
133. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548 (Vicki Been et al. eds. 3d ed.
2009).
134. See id. at 552 (describing the exceptions to the state action doctrine).
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state.135 To be “fairly attributable,” the private party must either be:
(1) performing a sovereign function;136 (2) engaging in a joint activity with
the state, resulting in either a concerted activity or a mutually beneficial relationship;137 or (3) performing an act that is affirmatively authorized by the
state.138 Once a private actor is found to be performing an action fairly attributable to the state, the private actor is deemed a “state actor.”139 Although a very difficult standard to meet, Facebook could potentially be
considered to be in a mutually beneficial relationship140 with the Government, thus making the United States Constitution applicable. Facebook allows the United States Government access to Facebook’s database and
user information.141 The standard for a mutually beneficial relationship
135. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 836–38 (1982) (discussing that in order
for the Fourteenth Amendment to be made applicable to the plaintiff, the actions of the plaintiff
must be “fairly attributed” to the State).
136. See generally id. at 842.
137. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris, 407 U.S. 163, 172, 175 (1972). See generally
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
138. See generally Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967).
139. Sheila Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization
and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203, 209–10 (2001) (stating a
private act becomes attributable to the government, or a state action, “[w]hen the relationship
between government and citizen becomes more complex than that between a mere commodity or
service provider and its customers”).
140. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724–25 (holding that the City and the private party had a
mutually beneficial relationship; a relationship where, considering numerous factors, the state and
private actor both profited from the relationship).
141. Accord Julie Masis, Is this Lawman Your Facebook Friend?, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 11,
2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2009/01/11/is_this_lawman_your_facebook_
friend?page=full (stating there are documented incidents where law enforcement has in fact used
Facebook in pursuing investigations). See generally Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (explaining
Facebook shares user information when lawfully requested. For Facebook to share user information there need only be “good faith belief” that the disclosure is required or that it is necessary to
protect users.); see also Safety Center, Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating
Facebook “disclose[s] account records solely in accordance with [its] terms of service and applicable law, including the federal Stored Communications Act,” which prohibits Facebook from
releasing contents of a user account without a civil subpoena, court order, or warrant); Facebook
and Law Enforcement, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law (last visited
Apr. 16, 2012) (disclosing Facebook provides a limited amount of information to help law enforcement officials do their jobs); JOHN LYNCH & JENNY ELLICKSON, OBTAINING AND USING
EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES: FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, LINKEDIN, AND MORE,
COMPUTER CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SEC., DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 3, 2010), available at https://
www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/20100303__crim_socialnetworking.pdf (explaining in
the Department of Justice’s training materials that employees are able to use social media networks to “[r]eveal personal communications; [e]stablish motives and personal relationships;
[p]rovide location information; [p]rove and disprove alibis; [and] [e]stablish crime or criminal
enterprise,” among other “instrumentalities or fruits of crime.” Although the materials do not
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requires interdependence, with the state profiting from the specific activity challenged.142 Here, the challenged activity would be Facebook’s collection and use of its users’ biometric data. Although the state is not responsible for Facebook’s collection of biometric data, it could be shown
that both the state and Facebook derive a benefit from the relationship.143
Facebook permits the United States Government access to user information when there is a “good faith belief” that disclosure to the Government is required or necessary to protect users.144 In fact, the Government
paid a private company $11 million to “monitor and prepare surveillance
reports on public reaction [to major Government proposals] posted on
Facebook.”145 While this example does not furnish direct insight into the
Government’s handling of biometric data on Facebook, it does suggest the
Government is readily accessing Facebook users’ information and demonstrates the types of information Facebook is able to provide to the government. In addition, state law enforcement agencies are able to access Facebook databases for policing purposes.146 With access to Facebook’s
database, the Government conceivably has access to the biometric data of
all Facebook users—approximately 800 million people.147
While it is certainly feasible that law enforcement and/or the Government is using Facebook’s biometric data, the extent of the relationship is
uncertain because Facebook does not reveal how frequently the Government traffics and utilizes the website.148 It is clear, however, that Facebook
expressly mention Facebook, there is information in the training materials regarding “tagging”—
verbiage unique to Facebook.).
142. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724–25 (holding that the City and the private party had a mutually beneficial relationship; a relationship where, considering numerous factors both parties profited
from the relationship).
143. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842–43 (explaining that in order for the defendant to
be found a state actor the relationship must be mutually beneficial and both parties must derive a
benefit from the precise activity being challenged).
144. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (stating Facebook will share information in response to legal requests from jurisdictions inside and outside of the United States).
145. See Andrea Stone, DHS Monitoring of Social Media Under Scrutiny By Lawmakers,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/dhs-monitoringof-social-media_n_1282494.html.
146. See Facebook and Law Enforcement, supra note 141 (stating Facebook allows law
enforcement agencies to access the Facebook database as long as a court order or civil subpoena
is granted).
147. Id.
148. See Jeff John Roberts, The Relationship Between Facebook and the Law, GLOBE &
MAIL (Jul. 12, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/digital-culture/socialnetworking/the-relationship-between-facebook-and-the-law/article2094889/ (stating “Facebook
apparently did not inform account-holders or their lawyers about government snooping” and further describing the relationship between Facebook and the government. Notably, in an interview
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donates money to federal candidates to protect itself from stringent privacy
policies, further entangling the two parties.149 Facebook has formed a political action committee that allows employees to funnel contributions to
federal candidates who share objectives similar to those of Facebook.150
Moreover, on the “Facebook Live” page, Facebook frequently endorses
candidates by featuring their discussions live.151 The connection between
Facebook and the Government appears to continually expand, and arguably, so does their mutually beneficial relationship.152
1. The Fourth Amendment’s Privacy Protection of the
Person and Possessions
Assuming Facebook can surpass the difficult test of being deemed a
state actor, a Facebook user may choose to invoke his or her Constitutional
right to privacy.153 The Constitution does not expressly grant the right to
privacy; however, a privacy right is implied through the “penumbras” found
within the Constitution.154 Precedent holds that the Fourth Amendment
provides each individual with a right to privacy where there is: (1) an actual
expectation of privacy, and (2) the expectation is reasonable based on societal standards.155 However, any reasonable expectation of privacy is relinquished when information is given to a third party because the third party
then has the ability to inspect and consume the information in any manner
he or she sees fit.156 This doctrine is termed the “third party doctrine” and
undoubtedly becomes an obstacle for Facebook users bringing suit.157
Nevertheless, Facebook is violating its users’ privacy irrespective of
the third party doctrine.158 Facebook users have an expectation of privacy
Facebook Chief Security Officer Joe Sullivan remained silent when pressed to reveal how many
warrants had been served on Facebook.).
149. See Jim Puzzanghera, Facebook to Launch Its Own Political Action Committee, L.A.
TIMES TECH. (Sept. 26, 2011, 3:03 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/09/
facebook-to-launch-its-own-political-action-committee-.html.
150. See id.
151. See Facebook Live, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/FBLive?sk=wall (last
visited Apr. 16, 2012).
152. See Roberts, supra note 148 (explaining the expanding relationship between Facebook and the Government).
153. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to
privacy as legitimate and preventing state actors from influencing intimate decisions).
154. Id. at 484.
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
156. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
157. See id.
158. See id.
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in their biometric data. The many users who were both surprised and hostile upon discovering that their biometric data was being extracted from
pictures exemplify an actual expectation of privacy in this information.159
Society seems to agree that this information is private. Most individuals,
for instance, protect personally identifiable information, such as their social
security numbers, which is comparable to biometric data.160 The challenge
becomes the third party doctrine. When users upload photos on Facebook,
they transmit and share information with third parties, such as their Facebook friends and Facebook itself.161 Based on the third party doctrine,
Facebook users lose any reasonable expectation of privacy in their photographs upon such transmittal. While users lose their reasonable expectation
of privacy to their photographs, do they additionally lose their reasonable
expectation of privacy to their biometric data?162
As technology advances, so does the idea of privacy rights.163 For example, in Kyllo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that searches
involving technological advances that reveal “intimate details” of the home
are an improper search and thus violate a person’s privacy rights.164 Similarly, Facebook is using advanced technology to extract intimate details from a
person’s photo.165 Thus, the argument could be made that a Facebook user
has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning his or her biometric data,
since the technology used to collect the data is not just a simple enhancement, but rather an invasion into a person’s intimate details.166 Overall, as
discussed, finding a Constitutional violation would be a difficult task with
multiple hurdles. Accordingly, a California user may have a greater chance
in bringing suit by alleging violations of the California Constitution.

159. See Daily Mail Reporter, supra note 7.
160. Joshua J. McIntyre, Balancing the Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should be Protected As Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL
L. REV. 895, 903 (describing how Social Security numbers and biometric data can both identify
specific individuals).
161. Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (describing that when users post images on Facebook, Facebook receives the information from the photographs, in addition to the individual users
allowed to see the image).
162. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40–41 (explaining that generally, when an individual gives
information to a third party, the individual then loses his or her reasonable expectation of privacy
in that information).
163. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).
164. See id.
165. McCullagh, supra note 5.
166. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
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2. The California Constitutional Violations
States have the ability to afford greater rights than the federal government, ergo the state of California has granted its citizens more privacy
protection than the federal government.167 As a result, Facebook has violated the California Constitution as well. Assuming Facebook is a state actor, the California Constitution is applicable to Facebook because there is
personal jurisdiction—the right to subject Facebook to California laws.168
The personal jurisdiction analysis necessary to determine whether Facebook is subject to California law is as follows: (1) the corporation’s headquarters are in Menlo Park,169 and (2) the privacy violations occurred in,
were directed from, and emanated from California.170 Additionally, personal jurisdiction exists for the following reasons:
1. [A] substantial portion of the wrongdoing took place in
California;171
2. Facebook is authorized to do business in California;172
3. Facebook has sufficient minimum contacts with the
state;173 and

167. Leonel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2005).
168. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–320 (1945) (holding that personal
jurisdiction exists when a corporation is carrying on systematic and continuous activities within a
state, and those activities result in a “large volume of interstate business, in the course of which
[that corporation] received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state”).
169. Careers, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/careers/life.php (last visited Apr.
16, 2012).
170. Facebook’s headquarters, where decisions regarding the facial recognition tool were
made, are in California. See id.
171. The wrongdoing argued in this Comment is the taking of biometric data from Facebook users’ images. This decision to implement the facial recognition tool was likely made at the
Facebook headquarters because the headquarters are the location where the decision-making individuals are stationed and perform their work. See Careers: Menlo Park, CA, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/careers/department.php?dept=menlo-park (last visited Apr. 16, 2012)
(discussing the positions that are stationed at Facebook headquarters include Corporate Communications, Business Development, Program Management, Data Center Designs, etc.).
172. Complaint at 8, Juror Number One v. California, No. 11CV00397, 2011 WL
507296 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (“Defendant FACEBOOK, INC., is . . . authorized to do business in California.”).
173. Since a majority of Facebook’s decisions and work is done at its headquarters in California, minimum contacts can be established. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
464, 487 (1985) (discussing that minimum contacts can be determined by establishing the company had “substantial and continuing relationship” in the jurisdiction. Factors considered to make
the determination that a relationship exists include, but are not limited to, the percent of business
completed at the operation.).
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4. Facebook intentionally avails itself of the markets in the
state through the promotion, marketing and sale of
products and services in the state.174
With personal jurisdiction established, California’s constitutionally
established “inalienable right” to privacy is thus applicable to Facebook.175
There is no categorical test to prove a privacy violation in California.176
Instead, a plaintiff must meet a threshold to establish a valid claim.177 To
support a valid claim, the plaintiff must establish, at the minimum: “(1) a
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy
under the circumstances; and (3) conduct by the defendant that amounts to
a serious invasion of the protected privacy interest.”178
If a plaintiff is able to meet the threshold requirements, the court will
engage in a balancing test that measures the countervailing interests supporting the conduct in question and the intrusion of privacy resulting from
the conduct.179 A plaintiff may rebut a showing of countervailing interests
by demonstrating that there were “‘feasible and effective alternatives’ with
a ‘lesser impact on privacy interests.’”180 The California standard is easier
to meet than the federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment standard because in California, the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
based on “customs, practices, and physical settings” surrounding the alleged violation, any notice provided, and any consent obtained.181
The Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press decision, in which the court
held that the Associated Press did not violate any privacy rights by reposting photographs originally posted on a website maintained by the
plaintiff, highlights the application of the California standard.182 In Four
Navy Seals, the wife of a Navy Seal maintained an online photo album,

174. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475–76 (establishing that for personal jurisdiction to
exist, defendant must meet the purposeful availment criteria, which take into account defendant’s
activities within a state).
175. See Hooser v. Super. Ct., 84 Cal. App. 4th 997 (2000).
176. Leonel, 400 F.3d at 712.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab, 135 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998).
180. Id. at 1271.
181. Compare id. at 1269 (stating that the test for a violation of privacy is a balancing test
that considers the degree of intrusiveness, the state’s interests in requiring intrusion, and the efficacy of the state’s means for meeting its needs), with Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7
Cal. 4th 1, 30 (1994) (“[T]he diversity of federal constitutional ‘privacy’ interests has left the federal right to privacy . . . without any coherent legal definition or standard.”).
182. Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
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which included images of her husband and other active duty Navy Seal
members in full uniform abusing war prisoners.183 An Associated Press reporter discovered the images while performing a search on the Internet,
downloaded them, and eventually published them.184 The court stated that
the Navy Seals did not have a reasonable expectation that the images would
remain private after posting the images online, and thus the members had
no right to privacy under California’s constitution.185
Similar to the wife in Four Navy Seals, Facebook users are willingly
posting images online.186 Nonetheless, Facebook’s actions are distinguishable. Facebook did more than simply repost the image in a different forum;
Facebook used the image to extract sensitive information from unsuspecting
users.187 The act of extracting biometric data is not foreseeable, especially
when Facebook users were unaware Facebook was using facial recognition
technology.188 Most users know how to download a photograph from Facebook because it is a simple process.189 However, due to the complex nature
of creating facial recognition algorithms, the vast majority of users likely
does not compile information from photographs posted on Facebook to create a facial template of their friends, thus enabling them to link a user to his
or her Facebook profile and other sensitive information.190
Thus, when applying the standard emanated in Four Navy Seals,
Facebook users cannot expect the image itself to remain private, but have a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to their biometric data. Before the data collection, Facebook did not provide notice or obtain consent from its
users, as it was only after the data collection that Facebook announced its

183. Id. at 1141.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 1143.
186. See id.
187. See Oreskovic, supra note 80 (stating that sensitive information like e-mail addresses
may become associated with the Facebook database, and quoting Facebook’s spokesperson as
saying, “we should have been more clear with people during the roll-out process when this became available to them”).
188. Id. (“[W]e should have been more clear during the roll-out process when this became
available to them.”).
189. See Jaime A. Madell, The Poster’s Plight: Bringing the Public Disclosure Tort
Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 895, 900 (2011) (“[A] user could simply click the ‘download’ link that appears underneath photos in the Facebook viewing console.”).
190. See Face Recognition, BIOMETRICS.GOV, 1 (2006), available at http://www.
biometrics.gov/Documents/facerec.pdf (describing how facial recognition has become a “science
of sophisticated mathematical representations and matching processes”); see also Keller, supra
note 11 (describing how, with the use of facial recognition programs, individuals can connect a
stranger to his or her identity and other private information).
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use of facial recognition technology.191 Additionally, it was not the usual
practice and custom of Facebook to collect the biometric data of its users.192 As a result, Facebook users would have a reasonable expectation of
privacy as to the collection of their biometric data.
B. Facebook’s Common Law Tort Violations
Privacy torts protect individuals from the “mental pain and distress”
inflicted by the broadcasting of personal details.193 There are four different
torts that encompass the common theme of the right “to be let alone”[:]194
(1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) publicity given to private life; (3) publicity
placing person in a false light; and (4) appropriation of name or likeness.195
The two torts Facebook is potentially violating are: (1) appropriation of
name or likeness and (2) intrusion upon seclusion.
1. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
There is an appropriation of name or likeness when: (1) a plaintiff’s
name or likeness is used for the commercial benefit (2) without consent or
a license.196 The primary interest is similar to a property right—the ability
of an individual to have the exclusive rights to his or her identity.197
It is no secret Facebook uses its members for commercial benefit; Facebook’s members have become tools to attract advertisers.198 As a result,
Facebook has an incentive to increase its user base, thus enabling it to have

191. See Oreskovic, supra note 80 (“[W]e should have been more clear with people during the roll-out process when this became available to them.”).
192. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (stating that one’s name, profile pictures, network, and username are always publically available, but all other data collected is that which one
may choose to make public).
193. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
196 (1890).
194. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
195. Id. at 389 (dividing privacy torts into four distinct torts).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).
197. Id. (“The interest protected by the rule stated in this Section is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity . . . .”).
198. See Eric Eldon, Facebook Revenues up to $700 Million in 2009, On Track Towards
$1.1 Billion in 2010, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/03/
02/facebook-made-up-to-700-million-in-2009-on-track-towards-1-1-billion-in-2010/; see also
Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/advertising/?campaign_id=402047449186
&placement=pf&extra_1=0 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (indicating to potential clients that Facebook provides the ability to “[c]onnect with more than 800 million potential customers”).
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more users to market.199 Facebook is able to increase its user base and compete with similar networking websites by updating its features and tools to
enhance and facilitate the networking experience—one such enhancement
being the tag suggestions feature.200 With each enhancement, Facebook collects more user data201 and is able to use this data to entice advertisers to
market their products on Facebook.202 Facebook’s database of biometric data is especially appealing to marketing companies that are already using facial recognition technology to tailor ads and suggestions to consumers.203
Furthermore, Facebook often bestows advertising companies with its
users’ personal information, their names and likenesses, for financial profit
without those users’ consent and knowledge.204 For example, Facebook
faced a lawsuit in October 2010 concerning a leak of user ID numbers to
outside advertising firms.205 Facebook’s privacy policy states it will not
sell its users’ personal information.206 However, when a user clicks on a
third party advertisement, Facebook simultaneously sends a referral.207 The
referral “reveals the specific webpage [sic] address that the user was looking at prior to clicking on the advertisement,” and may transmit “substan199. See Jeff Macke, 3 Ways Facebook Plans to Exploit Users, YAHOO! FIN. (Feb. 2,
2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/3-ways-facebook-ipo-exploit-users-172215377.html
(discussing how ninety percent of Facebook’s revenue is derived from Facebook selling users’
information to advertisers, which had generated a revenue of $3.7 billion. Thus, Facebook is able
to generate $4.50 with each user.).
200. See Jason DeRusha, Good Question: Why Does Facebook Keep Changing?,
CBSMINNESOTA.COM (Sept. 22, 2011), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/09/22/good-question
-why-does-facebook-keep-changing/; see also Barbara Ortutay, Q&A: The latest “New Facebook”, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-09-23/
facebook-user-guide/50529242/1.
201. See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline/
(explaining how Facebook has evolved and now requires users to list particular information and
also allow the information to be made public).
202. See Facebook for Business, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/
(last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (showing advertisers that they will be able to hand pick their audience
based on information users have listed on their profile, such as their location and education).
203. See Shan Li & David Sarno, Advertisers Start Using Facial Recognition to Tailor
Pitches, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/21/business/la-fi-facial
-recognition-20110821.
204. See Macke, supra note 199 (discussing how Facebook sells its user’s information).
205. See District Court Upholds Facebook’s Practice of Forwarding User Information to
Online Advertisers, LAW, TECH. & ARTS BLOG (July 17, 2011), http://wjlta.wordpress.com/2011/
07/17/ninth-circuit-upholds-facebook%E2%80%99s-practice-of-forwarding-user-information-toonline-advertisers/.
206. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12.
207. See District Court Upholds Facebook’s Practice of Forwarding User Information to
Online Advertisers, supra note 205.

2012]

FACEBOOK OR FACE BANK?

215

tial” information about the user.208 Despite the court’s holding that Facebook’s practice of disclosing information was not illegal,209 the court recognized that Facebook “shares users’ personal information with third-party
advertisers without users’ knowledge or consent, in violation of [Facebook]’s own policies.”210
Facebook has already collected its users’ facial templates (their likenesses) without their consent.211 In light of Facebook’s past and current
use of its users’ data, it is evident Facebook is familiar with profiting from
its users’ likenesses.212 Now, with access to each of its users’ personally
identifiable information, Facebook conceivably will be able to further profit from its users’ likenesses.
2. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Facebook could also be liable for intrusion upon seclusion. Under
this tort theory, a plaintiff needs to prove the defendant has substantially
interfered and intruded upon the plaintiff’s personal and private affairs.213
An act is considered a substantial intrusion if it is an intentional interference with a private place or matter in which a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy.214 There are two primary obstacles in applying this
tort. First, if the image is taken in a public arena, courts have held that intrusion upon seclusion does not apply.215 Second, even if the photograph
was not taken in a public forum, by posting the image on Facebook, the
plaintiff is placing the photograph in an arena that is not secluded.216 However, there is an applicable exception. An individual, even if in a public

208. See id.
209. See id.
210. In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
211. In re Facebook and the Facial Identification of Users, supra note 82 (stating the biometric data collection “occurred without the knowledge or consent of Facebook users”).
212. See Macke, supra note 199 (stating Facebook sells its users’ information to marketing companies).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
214. See generally id. § 652B cmts. a–b.
215. Id. § 652B cmt. c (“Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion . . . .”)
216. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (explaining that Facebook is not a secluded arena because select information is made public and thus is available to “anyone, including people
off of Facebook”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977) (“The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself.”).
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arena, can allege intrusion upon seclusion if the information that is intruded
upon is not available to “public gaze.”217
The National Science and Technology Council’s report acknowledges
that biometric data is sensitive and personal information,218 and arguably a
private affair. Though Facebook users post images that are taken in the
public arena,219 a user’s biometric data is still private information because
the data (for example, the exact measurement between a user’s eyes) is information that is not available to public gaze.220 Biometric data is thereby
more than a mere image publicly posted on Facebook—it is a template of
data and a breakdown of one’s face.221 Most persons may feel like the exact nature of their facial shape—the exact measurements between their
eyes, the width of their nose, the length of their jawbone—is private information.222 Also, Facebook’s intrusion into the private affairs of its users
was covert and intentional.223 Since the extraction of the data requires a
complex methodology,224 it is unlikely the information was collected in error. Therefore, users could legitimately claim that Facebook has substantially intruded upon its users’ private affairs by secretively collecting the
facial template of each of its users.
Finally, there is not a clear set of directions on Facebook regarding
how to opt out of the tag suggestion tool and have Facebook delete stored
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff . . . that are not exhibited to the public
gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”).
218. See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 8.
219. See Chris Cox, Making it Easier to Share with Who You Want, FACEBOOK BLOG
(Aug. 23, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150251867797131 (suggesting Facebook users upload photographs taken in public locations).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff . . . that are not exhibited to the public
gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”); see
also Bosnor & Johnson, supra note 34 (explaining that facial recognition systems collect biometric data and then measure the distances between 80 reference points on the face by creating
numerical codes).
221. VeriLook Algorithm Features and Capabilities, NEUROTECHNOLOGY, http://www.
neurotechnology.com/verilook-technology.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (explaining how facial
recognition technology creates a template of the face and stores the information in a database).
222. See Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 34 (discussing the facial features facial recognition software measures).
223. See In re Facebook and the Facial Identification of Users, supra note 85 (stating
Facebook intentionally collected the biometric data, and the collection was “without the knowledge or consent of Facebook users”).
224. Nathan Chandler, How Facebook Tags Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (July 12, 2011),
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/tips/facebook-photo-tags2.htm (discussing how facial recognition involves complex algorithms and programming).
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biometric data. As a result, users are likely required to navigate their way
through a multi-layered process and to refer to an instruction guide from an
outside source.225 Consequently, it is difficult for users to prevent and stop
the intrusion.
IV. THE HURDLES IN SUING FACEBOOK
Two primary issues plague private lawsuits against Facebook and
can deter individuals from pursuing litigation against Facebook. First, in
order to have standing226 there must be an injury-in-fact.227 However, this
element is hard to prove because of the difficultly in ascertaining the compensable injury suffered by the collection, possession, and use of the biometric data.228 Second, when users upload their photographs to Facebook,
they consent to Facebook’s privacy policy.229 However, this procured
consent is unconscionable.230
In light of these difficulties, courts should place an intrinsic value on
privacy, thereby creating a compensable injury-in-fact and allowing individuals to bring claims against companies, such as Facebook, that violate
privacy rights.
A. The Difficulty of Defining Damages
To assert a claim against Facebook, the harm that results in the collection, possession, and use of the biometric data must be quantifiable because
225. Erica Ho, How to Make Facebook Stop Recognizing Your Face in Photos, TIME
TECHLAND (June 8, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://techland.time.com/2011/06/08/how-to-makefacebook-stop-recognizing-your-face-in-photos/ (describing how it is confusing for users to
navigate their way through the opt out process); see also Data Protection Issues with Facebook’s
Facial Recognition Function, DR. WIDMER & PARTNERS, ATT’YS LAW (Sept. 2011),
http://www.widmerpartners-lawyers.ch/en/news/news/newsitems/Data+protection+issues+with+
Facebook%E2%80%99s+new+facial+recognition+function.htm (“[T]he opt-out feature is both
difficult for users to find on the website and difficult to use. [Further,] it is unclear whether users
who have chosen to opt out of the feature actually have their biometric data deleted, or whether
the tagging mechanism is merely blocked . . . .”).
226. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (holding that to appear in court, a
party must have standing to sue; the right to adjudicate their claim(s)).
227. U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
228. See What’s the Harm? Disputing Damages in Privacy Violation Cases, WILEY REIN
LLP PRIVACY FOCUS (June 2002), http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&
newsletter=4&id=3079 (stating that courts have had difficulty in finding the value of privacy and
non-tangible items because of the difficulty in quantifying the damage). As such, because biometric data is non-tangible, it would be difficult for the court to assess the damage.
229. Data Use Policy, supra note 12.
230. See infra Part IV.B.

218

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:187

federal and state courts can only adjudicate actual “cases and controversies.”231 To prove standing, there must be an injury-in-fact, a casual connection between the injury and the alleged conduct, and the injury must be
susceptible to resolution through a favorable decision.232 An injury-in-fact
must be “distinct and palpable,”233 meaning it must be inimitable, tangible,
and not abstract.234 Courts also typically do not find standing in cases
where the issues are of broad social impact.235 Similarly, to have standing
in California, there must be an injury-in-fact; however, if the injury is not
compensable by restitution, a court may still find standing exists if the injury was caused by an unfair business practice.236
Facebook’s facial recognition tool is a recent advent and the totality
of the injuries have yet to manifest;237 thus it is difficult to determine the
damages that will result from Facebook’s invasion of privacy. Unfortunately, current privacy law does not consider the collection of personal information238 or the risk of damage239 enough to constitute an injury. This
sentiment has become a common theme, and courts frequently find that
personal information, including information that is collected online and
easily manipulated, is not intrinsically valuable.240 However, the majority
of lawsuits that consumers have filed against companies collecting personal
data have dealt with consumers’ email addresses, mailing addresses, and
purchasing history.241 This information is personal but not as sensitive in
231. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (“Article III of the Constitution confines the federal
courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”).
232. See id. at 750–51.
233. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
234. See id. at 508 (stating a plaintiff must allege “specific, concrete facts demonstrating
that the challenged practices harm him, and that the plaintiff would personally benefit in a tangible way from the court’s intervention”).
235. See id. at 499 (holding that a litigant must assert an injury that is peculiar to himself
or to a distinct group of which he is a part, rather than one “shared in substantially equal measure
by all or a large class of citizens”).
236. See Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosmetics, Inc., 640 F.3d. 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
237. See Singer, supra note 38 (discussing the potential harms that can be a result of
Facebook’s facial recognition software).
238. See What’s the Harm? Disputing Damages in Privacy Violation Cases, supra
note 228.
239. See generally Aronson v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 767 A.2d 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
240. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding
that a cardholder’s name and spending information have little intrinsic value); see also What’s the
Harm? Disputing Damages in Privacy Violation Cases, supra note 228.
241. See generally Powers v. Pottery Barn, Inc., 177 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1045–46
(2009) (holding that e-mail addresses are not personal information as defined in the California
Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, an Act that prohibits retailers from collecting personally identifiable information).
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nature as biometric data largely because it is information that is readily
placed on the Internet and does not include unique, personal identifiers.242
If injury is established, the court still needs to find that injury compensable.243 For example, in the case Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,
the plaintiffs alleged that a hacker accessed their personal information from
Old National Bancorp’s website, but did not allege identity theft.244 The
Seventh Circuit court found the alleged injury, accessing personal information, sufficient to confer standing, but did not find the injury compensable.245 Nevertheless, the court held that the “time spent . . . seeking to prevent or undo the harm” from a data breach is a compensable injury.246
Facebook’s privacy breach has not created a discernible, compensable injury. Although it is difficult and time consuming to figure out how
to have Facebook remove the facial recognition tool, it is not impossible.247 The difficulties do not rise to the level of causing a compensable
injury since, as previously stated, there are several media outlets that have
published instructional guides on how to remove one’s biometric data
from Facebook.248
In light of the difficulty in finding a compensable injury, courts need
to consider placing a greater value on the biometric data and the protection
of the data to prevent privacy intrusions. Already courts have allowed nontangible claims such as economic advantage and family development to
have an intrinsic interest.249 The list of non-tangible claims that have been
granted an intrinsic interest must expand as technology advances and, con-

242. Compare NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 8, 21 (discussing how
biometric data is “sensitive personal information” and how biometrics are “affected by the individual’s unique genetic makeup”), with McIntyre, supra note 160 (explaining that e-mail addresses do not expressly identify an individual because “[e]-mail addresses may be shared, for example, by multiple people in one household (familyname@serviceprovider.com) or by multiple employees who sign in to a generic company account (info@company.com)”).
243. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] compensable injury proximately caused by the [defendant]” must be established to find the defendant in
violation and establish damages (emphasis added)).
244. See id. at 631 (emphasis added).
245. See id. at 640; see also Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (2010)
(concluding, despite plaintiffs meeting the standing requirement, that they failed to allege an injury sufficient to state a claim under relevant state law).
246. See generally Kuhn v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 05-P-810, 2006 WL 3007981, at
3 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 23, 2006).
247. Lee, supra note 89.
248. See id.
249. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 1915, 1931 (1986).
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sequently, makes the collection of biometric data easier for private companies capable of developing facial recognition software.250
B. Facebook’s Privacy Policy Is Unconscionable and
Negates User Consent
A contract that arises out of unequal bargaining power is deemed to be
unconscionable and unenforceable.251 To make this determination there must
be procedural and substantive unconscionability, both of which are determined by examining the terms of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the transaction.252 For procedural unconscionability, there must be
an indication of unequal bargaining power and the element of surprise;
meaning the unconscionable clause is usually buried in fine print and legalese.253 Substantive unconscionability is established when the terms are unreasonably favorable to one party; when the contract is “one-sided.”254
Facebook’s data use policy (“user agreement”) is potentially procedurally unconscionable because it incorporates an element of surprise by
not including information regarding Facebook’s biometric data collection.255 Facebook states that by creating an account and logging into one’s
Facebook account, a user has agreed to its privacy policy.256 The disclosure regarding this agreement is in fine print and notice of it only appears
on a user’s initial login.257 After the first login, the disclosure no longer
appears on the main login screen; however, the privacy policy can still be

250. See id. (stating that the Court has found an intrinsic interest in non-tangible claims
such as economic advantage, family development, the full power of the vote, not being forced to
disclose religious contributions, and not being forced to go to public schools).
251. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 388 (1960) (stating differences in bargaining power can enable courts to find a contract unenforceable); see also Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“It has been held as a matter of common law that unconscionable contracts are not enforceable.”).
252. See generally Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
253. See generally id.
254. See id. at 449 (“[O]ne who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms
might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge
of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent,
was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the . . . court should consider whether the terms of
the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.”).
255. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12.
256. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
257. Id.
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viewed by locating the link in the bottom right corner of the website.258 In
pertinent part, the privacy policy states:
When you post things like photos or videos on Facebook,
we may receive additional related data (or metadata259 ), such as
the time, date, and place you took the photo or video.
We receive data from the computer, mobile phone or other
device you use to access Facebook. This may include your IP
address, location, the type of browser you use, or the pages you
visit. . . . .
....
We only provide data to our advertising partners or customers after we have removed your name or any other personally
identifying information from it, or have combined it with other
people’s data in a way that it is no longer associated with you.260
The privacy policy does not disclose that Facebook collects and stores biometric data, thus creating an element of surprise.261
Finding information on Facebook’s biometric data collection can
prove to be a difficult task.262 In the “About” section, located at the bottom
right corner on Facebook’s homepage, there is a link to Resources, which
in turn links to “Bloggers at Facebook.”263 There, the search function
yields only one result when the term “biometrics” is searched.264 While the
result does suggest biometric data is private and needs to be protected, the
result does not state, or even allude to, Facebook’s collection of biometric

258. Id.
259. While the data use policy does state that it extracts metadata, this data is distinguishable from biometric data. Compare Woodward, Horn, Gatune & Thomas, supra note 33 (stating
biometric data is “a “measurable . . . distinctive physical characteristic or personal trait that can be
used to identify an individual”), with Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. AutomationDirect.com, Inc.,
248 F.R.D. 556, 557 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (defining metadata as information regarding “when the document was created [and] when it was modified . . . .”).
260. See Data Use Policy, supra note 12.
261. See id.
262. See FACEBOOK, supra note 256.
263. FACEBOOK BLOG, supra note 69.
264. Id.; Tim Sparapani, Viewpoints on Privacy for the Digital Age, FACEBOOK BLOG
(Jan. 28, 2010, 10:41 AM), https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?blog_id=company&blogger=
636748905.
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data and Facebook’s facial recognition tool.265 Additionally, when searching for information regarding “facial recognition,” the search yields seven
results, only one of which specifically relates to Facebook’s use of facial
recognition technology.266 Again, this result does not mention that biometric data is collected in conjunction with the facial recognition tool. It is
likely only a technologically savvy user would know facial recognition
software requires the collection of biometric data.267 The blog entry referencing the tag suggestions provides a link to a separate page called the
“Help Center.”268 Only when searching through the Help Center with the
phrase “photo comparison” does information alluding to biometric data collection finally emerge: “When you’re tagged in a photo, we associate the
tags with your account, compare what these tagged photos have in common
and store a summary of this comparison.”269 As demonstrated, information
regarding the mechanics of the tag suggestions tool is spread among several
pages and requires a user to perform keyword searches. Thus, it is conceivable that the user agreement is buried within the Facebook website, further contributing to the procedural unconscionability of the user agreement.
The substantive element is slightly more difficult to establish because
the contract concerning the biometric data is not entirely one-sided.270 On
one hand, Facebook users can network more efficiently with access to the
feature,271 which is the primary objective of Facebook.272 On the other hand,

265. Sparapani, supra note 264 (quoting Ann Cavoukian, the “Information and Privacy
Commissioner for Ontario, Canada,” as stating, “[t]he growth of privacy-invasive technologies
such as biometrics . . . has intensified the need to sharpen our focus on privacy and the best methods to protect it.”).
266. Mitchell I, supra note 1.
267. See Chandler, supra note 224 (discussing how facial recognition involves complex
algorithms and programming that require a computer programmer’s skill level).
268. See Mitchell I, supra note 1; see also FACEBOOK BLOG, supra note 69.
269. Help Center, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/search/?q=photo+
comparison (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); What Information Does Facebook Use to Tell that a Photo Looks Like Me and to Suggest that Friends Tag Me?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.
com/help/?faq=218540514842030#What-information-does-Facebook-use-to-tell-that-a-photolooks-like-me-and-to-suggest-that-friends-tag-me? (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
270. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (“[O]ne who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But
when a party of little bargaining power . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little
or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the . . . court should consider
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.”).
271. See Geuss, supra note 82 (“Facial recognition is a cool technology that Facebook is
using to add more convenience to the act of tagging people in photos. The technology may indeed create more connections between friends . . . .”).
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Facebook’s financial gains from the feature outweigh any efficiency given to
the users because Facebook can make a profit from each piece of information
Facebook stores regarding its users.273 Further evidencing the one-sided nature of the user agreement, Facebook misleads users as to the terms of the
agreement.274 As such, the contract with regard to Facebook’s acquisition of
biometric data is unconscionable and its terms should be unenforceable.
V. SUGGESTIONS
Biometric data is personally identifiable information that the government has recognized to be highly sensitive,275 therefore needing greater legal protections.276 The cry for assistance in creating protections does not
only come from individuals concerned about their privacy, but also from
the Biometrics industry.277 Industry leaders have asked for guidelines to
ensure the privacy of individuals who have had their biometric data collected without their consent—a situation similar to Facebook’s method of biometric data collection.278 For the guidelines to be most effective, they need
to be technology-based.279
Nevertheless, the United States has not created a uniform standard to
protect privacy rights by preventing companies such as Facebook from col272. Info, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook#!/facebook?sk=info (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (“Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to share and make the world
more open and connected.”).
273. See Macke, supra note 199; see also Somini Sengupta & Evelyn M. Rusli, Personal Data’s Value? Facebook is Set to Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A1, A15. (“Every
time a person shares a link, listens to a song, clicks on one of Facebook’s ubiquitous ‘like’ buttons, or changes a relationship status to ‘engaged,’ a morsel of data is added to Facebook’s vast
library. It is a siren to advertisers hoping to leverage that information to match their ads with
the right audience.”).
274. Julia Angwin, Shayndi Raice & Spencer E. Ante, Facebook Retreats on Privacy,
WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020422460457703
0383745515166.html (discussing a settlement reached between the U.S. government and Facebook over allegations Facebook misled users about its use of user information).
275. See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 21.
276. See id. at 14 (discussing how because biometric data is sensitive information, there
should be a system implemented to ensure the data remains private and does not infringe on individual rights).
277. David George, Face Recognition May Enhance Airport Security, CNN (Sept. 28,
2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-28/us/rec.airport.facial.screening_1_biometric-technologyface-recognitionvisionics?_s=PM:US.
278. See id. (“The [International Biomteric Industry Association] says there need to be
rules to protect the privacy of people whose faces are scanned in public places” such as airports,
where the individual is unaware his or her data is being collected).
279. See id. (“The harsh new realities [of biometrics] require vigorous, technology-based
responses . . . .”).
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lecting the data without user consent.280 Similarly, Congress failed to require
companies to ensure that proper measures have been taken to secure the data
once it has been collected.281 This section provides suggestions on how the
United States should protect individuals’ biometric data, particularly online.
Conveniently, the United States can look to Europe for guidelines.282 In addition, the United States Government should implement legislation to protect
biometric data similar to the legislation enacted to protect medical information.283 Finally, if Congress does not enact legislation heightening the
protection of biometric data, the Federal Trade Commission should both continue to intervene when companies place the privacy of their consumers at
risk and actively enforce settlements reached.284
280. See generally Helen Pidd, Facebook Facial Recognition Software Violates Privacy
Laws, Says Germany, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/aug/
03/facebook-facial-recognition-privacy-germany (“The tool runs all photos uploaded to the social
networking site through a [program] . . . . [T]hough users can opt out of the automatic tagging,
Facebook can still gather and store (indefinitely) all photos added to the site.” (emphasis added)).
281. In November of 2011, the Federal Trade Commission reached a settlement with
Facebook that requires Facebook to gain users’ affirmative consent before disclosing “nonpublic
user information” and that prevents Facebook from misleading users about the information that is
being collected. See Agreement Containing Consent Order at 4, In re Facebook, Inc. (No. 0923183), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf. The settlement
also requires Facebook to create a privacy program that addresses privacy risks of new products.
Id. at 5. Notably, the settlement does not create any guidelines and leaves the responsibility of
creating a comprehensive privacy scheme to Facebook. See generally id.
282. See supra Part V.A.
283. See id.
284. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) recently developed the Privacy and Identity
Protection division to assist in enforcing Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts. See Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
bcppip.shtm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (explaining the purpose of the Division of Privacy and
Identity Protection). The FTC found Facebook in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
led to the settlement between the FTC and Facebook. See Press Release, Facebook Settles FTC
Charges that It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises, FTC (Nov. 11, 2011),
available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm (“The social networking service
Facebook has agreed to settle Federal Trade Commission charges that it deceived consumers . . . .”). As part of the settlement, the FTC will monitor Facebook to ensure compliance with
the order. See id. While the settlement does showcase the FTC’s move to enforce privacy protections, there are nevertheless potential issues with the private settlements and the ability of the
FTC to enforce the orders. See Jeff Roberts, Facebook Settlement Shows FTC Getting New Traction with Privacy Enforcement, PAIDCONTENT (Nov. 11, 2011), http://paidcontent.org/article/419facebook-settlement-shows-ftc-getting-new-traction-with-privacy-enforce/ (“The settlement[] . . .
confirm[s] that . . . the FTC’s Consumer Bureau called ‘Privacy and Identity Protection’ aspires
to make a name for itself in online privacy issues.”); Tim Bukher, The Facebook FTC Settlement
Will Just Give Users a False Sense of Security, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-12-01/tech/30462143_1_facebook-privacy-pract (“The
problem is that this latest FTC settlement may . . . get users to drop their guards with a false sense
that the FTC has covered all the bases.”). For example, if a company breaches an FTC settlement, penalties can be imposed, but rarely are imposed. See Roberts, supra (“Technically, a
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A. Borrowing the Privacy Model from Europe
After Facebook disclosed its tags suggestions, European privacy regulators immediately began inquiring about Facebook’s facial recognition
technology.285 Namely, Germany alleged that Facebook is in violation of
both European and German privacy laws because the biometric database
has been compiled without user consent.286 Johannes Caspar, the Data Protection Supervisor in Hamburg, suggested there would be grave results if
the data Facebook has stored were to fall into the wrong hands.287 The
United Kingdom and Ireland have taken cue and are currently investigating
the feature.288
European countries were able to allege privacy violations because
these countries enacted a more stringent and sweeping privacy protection
program than the United States.289 The significant difference in the legal
policies was noted at the European Parliament’s Privacy Platform when
Facebook’s spokesperson acknowledged that Facebook honors the “transatlantic agreement to ensure European data remains safe and secure by European standards while in the United States.”290 The statement implies the
company that breaches the terms of an FTC settlement is liable for major civil penalties. In reality, though, such penalties are rarely imposed.”). Other issues with the FTC settlement include,
but are not limited to, the following: (1) Facebook is not required to admit wrongdoing; (2) without a legal proceedings, the privacy violations are not placed in the public spotlight; and (3) the
settlement applies only to Facebook; thus, there is an not as widespread an impact in the social
media arena. See id. (discussing the shortfalls of the FTC settlement).
285. Ryan Singel, Singel-Minded: Anatomy of a Backlash, or How Facebook Got an ‘F’
for Facial Recognition, WIRED EPICENTER (June 9, 2011), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/
06/anatomy-of-backlash/.
286. See Pidd, supra note 280.
287. See id.
288. See Steven Musil, Facebook Faces Lawsuit Over Facial-Recognition Feature,
CNET NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57322815-93/facebook-faceslawsuit-over-facial-recognition-feature/?part=rss&subj=latest-news&tag=title.
289. Matthew Taylor, Superinjunctions, Injunctions and Privacy Laws Around the World,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/apr/26/superinjunctionsinjunctions-privacy-laws; see also Byron Acohido, Critics Say Privacy Hearing Skewed Against
Consumers, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
technologylive/post/2011/09/critics-say-privacy-hearing-skewed-against-consumers/1
(noting
California Representative Mary Bono Mack held a public hearing in September of 2011 titled
“Internet Privacy: The Impact and Burden of EU Regulation.” When it was announced there
would not be a European witness to support the approach to privacy taken in the U.S., one privacy advocate explained, “this hearing could throw cold water on efforts to enact strong privacy
protections, such as those that exist in Europe, in the United States.”).
290. Zack Whittaker, Facebook Rebuked by EU Privacy Platform; Patriot Act a “Distraction”?, ZDNET (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/facebook-rebuked-by-euprivacy-platform-patriot-act-a-distraction/57482 (emphasis added).
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standards between the two continents are different, and that the European
standards are stricter than those of the United States.
Paul Schwartz, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and a director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, stated:
“In Europe, there is a comprehensive privacy law in each nation which requires that online privacy be protected. In the U.S., we regulate sector by
sector, and there are notable gaps in protection.”291
Schwartz is likely referring to the 1995 Directive Authorized (“1995
Directive”) by the European Union (“EU”),292 which was further embellished
in 2000 (“2000 Directive”).293 The European model is beneficial because it
creates a uniform law among EU members, who were required to adopt the
Directives,294 and establishes clear requirements.295 As a result, the EU is
less prone to gaps in privacy protections.296 Notably, the European Union
Safe Harbor requires companies to give prior opt-in consent before collecting
sensitive personal information.297 The United States government should construct a scheme similar to the European model by creating uniform laws to
help prevent inevitable future privacy violations.298

291. John Moe, What Can We Learn From Europe About Online Privacy?, AM. PUB.
MEDIA (Sept. 14, 2011), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/09/14/tech-reportwhat-we-can-learn-from-europe-about-online-privacy/?refid=0.
292. See S. REP. NO. 107-240, at 5 (2002) (explaining the 1995 European Directive governs online and offline data collection).
293. See generally Council Directive 45/2001 (EC) 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1 (EC).
294. See S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 5 (discussing that as of 1998, when the 1995 Directive
was adopted, each member state of the European Union was required to adopt a policy mirroring
the 1995 Directive); see also Council Directive 45/2001, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1 (EC) (“This
Regulation shall apply to the processing of personal data by [the European Community] and bodies insofar as such processing is carried out in the exercise of activities all or part of which fall
within the scope of Community law.”).
295. See S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 5–6 (explaining that the 1995 Directive requires companies “in both their online and offline practices, to provide: (1) notice; (2) an opt-out with respect
to non-sensitive commercial marketing of personal information; (3) an opt-in with respect to sensitive personal information; (4) a right of access to personal information collected; and (5) reasonable security protections for that information.”).
296. See Moe, supra note 291 (explaining Europe has a “comprehensive privacy law in
each nation,” thus Europe is less prone to gaps in regulation, whereas the U.S. regulates sector by
sector, which allows for inconsistencies); see also S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 6 (explaining that Europe had to create the European Union Safe Harbor in 2000, a set of less intrusive regulations that
allow U.S. companies to comply with the Directive).
297. S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 6.
298. Id. (suggesting state legislatures have enacted inconsistent privacy laws and would
prefer a more uniform standard).
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B. Applying the Same Protection for Medical Information to Biometrics
Despite the surge of interest in protecting personally identifiable information, Congress has been grappling with how to create laws that encourage innovation in technology, while also ensuring that information collection is “fair, transparent, and subject to law.”299 Congress’s struggle is
evidenced in proposed legislation such as the Online Personal Privacy Act
of 2002,300 the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002,301 and the Privacy Act of 2005.302 However, those laws have not yet been enacted.303 For
now, the legislature has focused on protecting medical information because
health insurance companies and various businesses keep client health and
medical information in electronic databases.304
Although medical information is considered extremely private, so is
facial recognition data, which can reveal unique characteristics about people.305 Additionally, the subcommittee on Biometrics explained that with
specialized training, some biometric models could potentially be used to
detect medical information or drug use.306 Thus, the legislature should give
biometric data the same protection as medical data.

299. Id.
300. Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201, 107th Cong. § 401 (2002).
301. Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. (2005).
302. See Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4678, 107th Cong. § 401 (2002).
303. See S. 2201; see also H.R. 1263.
304. Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 1
(2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html
(explaining the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPPA”) was enacted to protect the electronic storage of health information and ensure a patient’s health information is private). The Department of Health and Human Services also developed the Standards for
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy Rule”), which “appl[ies] to
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and to any health care provider who transmits health information in electronic form . . . .” Id. at 2. Overall, “[t]he Privacy Rule protects all ‘individually
identifiable health information’ held or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate,
in any form or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral.” Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). The general principle of the Privacy Rule is to require covered entities to disclose and request only the
minimum amount of protected health information. Id. at 6. Congress has since been vigilant in
enforcing HIPPA and, consequently, protecting medical information. See Rachel Grunberger,
Senate Hearings Focus on Lack of HIPPA Enforcement, Final HITECH Rule, INSIDE PRIVACY
(Dec.
22,
2011),
http://www.insideprivacy.com/senate-hearings-focus-on-lack-of-hipaaenforcement-final-hitech-rule/.
305. See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 14.
306. Id.
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C. Federal Agencies Avoid the Hurdle of Defining Damages
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) protects consumers from unfair or deceptive business practices through investigation and enforcement
actions.307 To pursue an enforcement action, the FTC must find a “reason
to believe” that the law has been violated.308 The “reason to believe”
standard to initiate proceedings is a less rigid standard than the standing requirement of injury-in-fact.309 Accordingly, the FTC is better suited to
tackle Facebook’s privacy violation, as the compensable-injury hurdle does
not exist under the FTC.310
However, this avenue might not be the most effective way to combat
Facebook’s privacy intrusion. In June 2011, Electronic Privacy Information
Center (“EPIC”) filed its Complaint with the FTC; however, the FTC is under no obligation to respond.311 In fact, after three months, the FTC’s indirect response to the complaint was to host a workshop discussing the privacy issues related to facial recognition technology.312 Thus, Facebook had
the opportunity to continue to violate its users’ privacy rights for 90 days
while awaiting the FTC workshop.313 In contrast, Facebook would have had
21 days to respond to a complaint filed in federal court314 and 30 days to respond in California,315 which could have allowed for a quicker remedy. Af-

307. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 20, at 3.
308. Id. at 2.
309. Compare A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and
Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 20, at 2 (“[T]he Commission may initiate an enforcement
action if it has ‘reason to believe’ that the law is being or has been violated.”), with Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (holding that litigant must assert an actual injury that is peculiar
to himself or to a distinct group of which he is a part, rather than one “shared in substantially
equal measure by all or a large class of citizens”).
310. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 20 (discussing that the FTC need only have reason to believe
there is a violation of the law to begin an investigation).
311. See John E. Villafranco, Challenging a Competitor’s Advertising Claims, ANTITRUST SOURCE (May 2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_
source/may05_villafranco.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that the FTC uses its own discretion to
determine which complaints it will pursue).
312. Press Release, FTC, FTC To Host Workshop on Facial Recognition Technology
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/09/facialrec.shtm.
313. Id.
314. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(i).
315. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 438(h)(2) (West 2011).
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ter five months, the FTC finally responded to EPIC’s complaint by reaching
a settlement with Facebook in November 2011.316
VI. CONCLUSION
Facebook violated the privacy rights of its users when it collected their
biometric data without consent. Even though users can possibly establish
Constitutional violations and potentially establish privacy tort violations, the
lack of value afforded to keeping biometric data private makes it very difficult to establish damages.317 While the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
remains a viable source to file a complaint,318 it may not be the most successful means because the FTC has the ability to choose which complaints
to pursue.319 Since it is difficult for private parties to protect their personal
information through the courts, Congress should step in and either (1) create
a uniform privacy model similar to Europe’s, or (2) create legislation that
protects biometric data similar to the legislation that has been created to protect health care information.320 If Congress were to apply greater protections to biometric data, thereby heightening privacy protections of personalized information, courts would be able to follow suit.

316. See Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep
Privacy Promises, supra note 19.
317. See supra Part IV.A.
318. See supra Part V.C.
319. See Villafranco, supra note 311 (explaining that the FTC uses its own discretion to
determine which complaints it will pursue).
320. See supra Part V.A–B.

